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DEBATE 
 
 
JUDICIAL RECUSAL AT THE COURT 
Later this month, all nine justices will be hearing oral argument on 
the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
and deciding the outcome of the case. But should they?  In Caperton v. 
A.T. Massey Coal Co., the Supreme Court held that a judge of the West 
Virginia Supreme Court violated the Due Process Clause of the Consti-
tution when the judge failed to recuse himself from a case involving a 
major campaign contributor.  Many cheered the case’s outcome, but 
Professor Ifill believes Caperton is an “ominous sign” that a majority of 
the Court fails to understand how dangerous the appearance of im-
propriety is in the American judicial system.  Professor Segall agrees 
that the judicial recusal system needs reform, but he disagrees with 
Professor Ifill over what amounts to an appearance of impropriety.  As 
the need for reform becomes more apparent in light of the constitu-
tional challenges to the Affordable Care Act, Professor Ifill and Profes-
sor Segall disagree over whether Justice Thomas or Justice Kagan 
ought to recuse themselves from the Court’s upcoming hearings.  
Their various perspectives highlight the confusion of contemporary 
recusal doctrine for America’s highest Court and make a strong case 
that the Court must do a better job of clarifying when a Justice should 
recuse him- or herself. 
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OPENING STATEMENT 
Justice and Appearance of Justice 
 
SHERRILYN A. IFILL† 
 
Chief Justice Roberts’s 2011 State of the Judiciary address con-
firmed what many court watchers have long suspected:  our Supreme 
Court fails to appreciate and understand fully how the appearance of 
bias among the Court’s Justices may increasingly undermine the legit-
imacy of the court’s decisionmaking and implicate the due process 
rights of litigants who appear before the Court.  See JOHN G. ROBERTS, 
JR., 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2011) [here-
inafter, ROBERTS, 2011 REPORT], available at http://www.supreme 
court.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011yearendreport.pdf.  An early clue 
to the mindset of the Roberts-led Court on this issue came in 2009 in 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).  In that case, 
the Court held that a West Virginia Supreme Court justice’s refusal to 
recuse himself from a case involving a litigant who had donated mil-
lions of dollars to secure the justice’s election violated the petitioner’s 
due process rights.  Id. at 2256-57, 2267. 
Although many regarded Caperton as a positive statement by the 
Court that judges must withdraw from cases in which their conduct 
raises an appearance of bias, I took a more skeptical view.  Caperton 
could hardly be considered a resounding affirmation of the Court’s 
commitment to ensuring both the fact and appearance of impartiality 
in judicial decisionmaking.  First, the decision was a narrow one.  Only 
a bare majority of the Justices thought that the West Virginia justice’s 
decision to sit and hear a multi-million dollar case affecting the busi-
ness interests of his benefactor raised due process questions.  Second, 
the majority opinion was a narrow one, with Justice Kennedy explain-
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ing over and over again that the holding was limited only to “extreme” 
cases.  Id. at 2265.  More robust was the four-member dissenting opin-
ion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, who opened with the charge 
that the majority’s decision would “undermine rather than promote,” 
the value of a “fair, independent, and impartial judiciary.”  Id. at 2267 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  What comes through most powerfully in 
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent is his deep skepticism about the pro-
spect of compelling the recusal of a judge or Justice based on the ap-
pearance of bias.  This skepticism is never more apparent than when 
Chief Justice Roberts predicts at the conclusion of his dissent that 
“opening the door to recusal claims under the Due Process Clause, for 
an amorphous ‘probability of bias’ [standard] will . . . bring our judicial 
system into  underserved disrepute.”  Id. at 2274 (quoting the majority).  
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent in Caperton powerfully foreshadows his 
resistance to entertaining calls for a more rigorous examination of Su-
preme Court recusal practice. 
The requirement of judicial recusal is based on the constitutional 
due process right of litigants to have their cases heard by an impartial 
tribunal.  As Justice Kennedy has remarked, “One of the very objects of 
law is the impartiality of its judges in fact and appearance.”  Liteky v. 
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 558 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, a federal judge or Justice must withdraw from a 
cases in which his or her “impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned.”  28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006).  The standard is an objective one, 
and requires that a judge consider the question not from his or her 
own perspective, but from the perspective of a reasonable person 
knowing the facts.  See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. United States, Order 
Denying Appeal, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302-03 (2000) (statement of 
Rehnquist, C.J.).  The Supreme Court has directed that, in assessing 
claims raised under § 455(a), the focus “is not the reality of bias or 
prejudice, but its appearance.”  Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548 (majority opin-
ion).  The appearance standard set out in § 455(a) is consistent with 
the Court’s determination over sixty years ago that “justice must satisfy 
the appearance of justice.”  Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 
(1954).  The connection between the constitutional due process right 
of litigants and the appearance of bias standard expressed in § 455(a) 
is precisely the standard that Chief Justice Roberts in Caperton seems to 
regard as a threat to the judicial system. 
Ironically, several years before finding that no constitutional ques-
tion was raised by the participation of the West Virginia justice in a 
case involving the state justice’s benefactor, Chief Justice Roberts iden-
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tified a circumstance in which, in his view, money paid to judges might 
raise constitutional issues.  In one of his earliest State of the Judiciary 
reports, Chief Justice Roberts warned that Congress’s failure to increase 
the pay of Article III judges had risen to the level of a “constitutional is-
sue.”  JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDI-
CIARY (2007), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-
end/2006year-endreport.pdf.  Roberts did not identify which aspect of 
the Constitution is threatened by the admittedly inadequate pay af-
forded federal judges.  It is difficult to see how Congress’s failure to 
increase federal judicial salaries to a competitive market level can raise 
a constitutional crisis, while the refusal of a judge to disqualify himself 
from hearing a case affecting a party who donated millions of dollars 
to securing his judgeship does not.  But such is the reasoning of our 
Chief Justice on this issue.   
In his latest report, Chief Justice Roberts attempted to take on the 
range of emerging critiques that go to the ethical conduct of the Jus-
tices.  First, he responded to arguments that the Justices should be 
bound by the Code of Judicial Conduct.  ROBERTS, 2011 REPORT, supra, 
at 2-5.  He correctly argued that the Code, by its own terms, does not 
apply to the Supreme Court.  Id. at 3.  It was a bit startling, however, for 
the Chief Justice to offer, as an explanation for why the Justices need 
not even voluntarily bind themselves to the standards set out in the 
Code, the fact that the Justices “may” consult a variety of sources to 
guide their ethical conduct.  Id. at 5.   
Of course the Justices “may” consult a variety of sources.  But do 
they?  Are the sources set out in the Chief Justice’s remarks—judicial 
opinions, treatises, scholarly articles, and disciplinary decisions—
consulted by all of the Justices?  The Chief Justice himself remarked 
last year that he does not read law review articles.  See John G. Roberts, 
Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Remarks at the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals Seventy-Seventh Annual Judicial Conference 
(June 25, 2011).  Should we presume that the inclusion of scholarly 
articles in the list of sources that Justices may consult on ethical ques-
tions is merely theoretical?  Is there any uniform practice to which the 
Justices adhere?  In sum, Chief Justice Roberts’s response gave very 
little new insight into how the Justices actually approach ethical issues. 
More important and detailed was Chief Justice Roberts’s effort to 
respond comprehensively to calls that Justices Kagan and Thomas 
should each withdraw from hearing the constitutional challenge to the 
health care law that the Court will hear this Term.  At issue was the 
obligation imposed on all federal judges by 28 U.S.C. § 455.   
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In my view, the case for Justice Thomas’s recusal is considerably 
more compelling than that for Justice Kagan.  Justice Thomas’s wife, 
Virginia Lamp Thomas, has led a Tea Party-affiliated lobbying group 
that has made the health care law a central target of its work.  See Jeffrey 
Toobin, Partners, NEW YORKER, Aug. 29, 2011, at 40, 41.  At an event 
last year, Justice Thomas reportedly made remarks that suggest his en-
dorsement of his wife’s political activities, describing her creation of 
the organization as working “in defense of liberty” and “defending 
. . . [the] Constitution.”  Id. at 48. 
Concerns about Justice Kagan’s impartiality arise largely from 
whether, as Solicitor General in the Obama Administration, she may 
have been involved in providing advice to members of the Administra-
tion on the soundness or constitutionality of the health care law.  See Eric 
Segall, A Liberal’s Lament on Kagan and Health Care, SLATE (Dec. 8, 2011, 
4:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurispru 
dence/2011/12/obamacare_and_the_supreme_court_should_elena_ka 
gan_recuse_herself_.html.  The evidence is largely limited to an email 
that then–Solicitor General Kagan sent to a colleague after learning of 
the passage of the health care legislation.  In the email, Kagan re-
marks, “I hear they have the votes . . . . Simply amazing!”  Id.  Mar-
veling at the fact that the controversial bill garnered sufficient votes to 
pass hardly seems to rise to the level needed for recusal, but it is certain-
ly fair to ask questions about how involved Kagan may have  
been in providing counsel to members of the Administration in fashion-
ing the health care law.   
In sum, both Justices have been the subjects of legitimate questions 
about whether they engaged in conduct that raises the appearance of 
bias and should preclude their participation in deliberations about the 
health care bill.  Of course, the Justices themselves know more than we 
do about their private conduct and their public statements or in-
volvement with advocates working for or against the legislation.  That’s 
why the appropriate process for determining whether Justices Kagan 
and Thomas should recuse themselves requires each Justice to engage 
in an objective analysis.  Chief Justice Roberts acknowledges this in his 
State of the Judiciary report.  He notes that the “individual Justices 
decide for themselves whether recusal is warranted under Section 
455.”  ROBERTS, 2011 REPORT, supra, at 8.  But having set out the ap-
propriate approach to a recusal determination, he then preempts the 
individual recusal consideration by offering encomiums to the integri-
ty, impartiality, and professionalism of his colleagues and painstakingly 
emphasizing why Supreme Court Justices should refrain from liberally 
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acceding to recusal.  One might even argue that the timing and sub-
stance of the Chief Justice’s statement implicitly warns off litigants 
from using § 455 to seek either Justice Thomas or Justice Kagan’s 
recusal in the health care litigation. 
Thus, while no doubt hoping to clarify and elucidate the Court’s 
approach to recusal, and seeking to quell criticism of the Court’s prac-
tices in this area, Chief Justice Roberts’s State of the Judiciary report 
may raise more concerns than it allays.   
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts’s statement fails to address the set 
of concerns that goes to the heart of the Court’s recusal practices.  
The stunning lack of transparency in these practices remains un-
changed, and leaves litigants and the public largely unable to under-
stand, track, or assess how or whether the Court’s recusal 
determinations adhere to the letter and spirit of the statute.  Chief Jus-
tice Roberts’s assurances that the impartiality of his colleagues on the 
Court is unassailable will allay neither the public’s sense of disquiet 
nor the confusion of litigants, who have few guidelines to assist them 
in making the important decision about whether to seek the recusal of 
a Supreme Court Justice.  The public and litigants before the Court 
would benefit from concrete practices that increase transparency.  For 
example, Chief Justice Roberts could ask that his colleagues regularly 
issue decisions—however brief—explaining their decision of whether 
to recuse themselves in cases in which recusal motions are filed.  This 
is a small step, but it would vastly improve current practice, in which 
recusal decisions are a rarity. 
One hopes that Chief Justice Roberts will, perhaps through the Ju-
dicial Conference, demonstrate a willingness to engage further with 
the profession on how to improve the Court’s recusal practices.  
Transparency will strengthen the public’s confidence in the Court 
and will better position litigants to protect their constitutional right 
to have their cases heard by a Court that satisfies both the fact and 
appearance of impartiality.   
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REBUTTAL 
Supreme Court Recusal, the Affordable Care Act, and the Rule of Law 
 
ERIC J. SEGALL† 
 
Professor Ifill has written a thoughtful and interesting Opening 
Statement concerning the recusal and ethical practices of Supreme Court 
Justices, whether Justices Kagan and Thomas should recuse themselves 
from the litigation over the Affordable Care Act (ACA), and the im-
portance of Chief Justice Roberts’s 2011 year-end report in addressing 
these issues.  See JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2011), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf.  Our areas of agreement 
easily outweigh our disagreements.  For example, I agree with Profes-
sor Ifill that the Justices need to be more transparent about their 
recusal decisions, that the Justices should voluntarily agree to be 
bound by the same ethical rules that apply to lower court judges, and 
that the Chief Justice’s report was dissatisfying, question-begging, and 
at least a little bit arrogant.  His calls for the American public and those 
litigating before the Court to trust that the Justices will act appropriately 
when considering recusal and ethical issues smack of hubris. 
Where Professor Ifill and I disagree is over the relative cases for 
recusal of Justices Thomas and Kagan in the health care litigation.  
Professor Ifill believes that the case “for Justice Thomas’s recusal is 
considerably more compelling than that for Justice Kagan.”  Professor 
Ifill argues that Justice Thomas’s wife created a lobbying group that 
“made the health care law a central target of its work,” and that Justice 
Thomas himself seemed to endorse those activities at a public event last 
year.  Those facts, according to Professor Ifill, suggest that Justice 
Thomas’s impartiality in the case could reasonably be questioned.  
Questions about Justice Kagan’s recusal stem from her possible in-
volvement with the health care issue while she was the Solicitor Gen-
eral in the Obama Administration, and the email exchange with 
Laurence Tribe—at the time a legal advisor to the Administration—in 
which she said “I hear they have the votes, Larry!!  Simply amazing.”  
See Eric Segall, A Liberal’s Lament on Kagan and Health Care, SLATE (Dec. 
8, 2011, 4:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
 
†
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jurisprudence/2011/12/obamacare_and_the_supreme_court_should_ 
elena_kagan_recuse_herself_.html.  Professor Ifill suggests that these 
facts probably do not support recusal, though she concedes that rea-
sonable questions about Justice Kagan’s involvement with the ACA 
could and perhaps should be asked.  
I think, when all the facts are considered, Professor Ifill understates 
the reasons Justice Kagan should recuse herself from the ACA litiga-
tion and overstates the need for Justice Thomas to recuse.  First, as to 
Justice Kagan, the case for her recusal is strong because of a “perfect 
storm” of events that are unlikely to repeat themselves again:  (1) she 
was the Solicitor General of the United States when the ACA was furi-
ously debated in Congress and town halls across the country; (2) the 
ACA is the most controversial and partisan piece of legislation that the 
Obama Administration has put forward; (3) she was nominated to the 
Court by President Obama shortly after Congress enacted the ACA; 
(4) the Court will review the ACA just a few months before President 
Obama runs for reelection; (5) the President’s reelection might well 
be affected by how the Supreme Court rules; (6) she celebrated the 
passage of the ACA over email with Professor Tribe; and, (7) both her 
Office and her Deputy, Neil Katyal, were involved in the Obama Ad-
ministration’s litigation strategy in the lower federal courts on the issue 
of the ACA’s constitutionality.  Segall, supra. 
Federal law requires Supreme Court Justices to recuse themselves if 
their “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” or if the Justice 
previously served in governmental employment and in that capacity 
“participated as counsel, adviser, or material witness concerning the 
proceeding.”  28 U.S.C. § 455(a)–(b) (2006).  Under these standards, 
there is no question that Katyal would have had to recuse himself had 
he been appointed to the Court.  He was a counselor and adviser on 
the issue and, once having served in that capacity, his “impartiality” 
could and would be “questioned.”  
Katyal was working directly for Kagan, and publicly available docu-
ments show that he informed her that the Solicitor General’s Office 
would be involved in the health care litigation in the lower courts—
not a common occurrence for that office.  See Terence P. Jeffrey, Kagan 
to Tribe on Day Obamacare Passed:  “I Hear They Have the Votes,  
Larry!!  Simply Amazing,” CNSNEWS.COM (Nov. 10, 2011), http:// 
cnsnews.com/news/article/kagan-tribe-day-obamacare-passed-i-hear-they-
have-votes-larry-simply-amazing.  It simply does not make sense, nor is 
it good policy, to suggest that the Solicitor General of the United States 
does not have to recuse herself from a case her Office worked on be-
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cause she decided to have no personal contact with the case.  In other 
words, even if Kagan was not technically a “counselor” or “adviser” on 
the issue, what possible motivation would she have for creating a fire-
wall on this issue between herself and the rest of her office, or in fact 
the whole Administration?  What explanation could she offer to justify 
the firewall that would not raise questions about her “impartiality” on 
this issue?  It would be an odd rule that the head of a United States 
agency could avoid future recusals by intentionally staying away from 
an explosive legal issue in anticipation of being asked to serve on the 
Supreme Court by a President with an enormous stake in that particu-
lar issue.  It must also be remembered that, as far as we know, the only 
case Justice Kagan intentionally stayed away from while serving as the 
Solicitor General was the ACA litigation.  In her first Term, she 
recused herself from twenty-five of the first fifty-one cases before the 
Court.  Robert Barnes, Recusals Could Force Newest Justice to Miss Many 
Cases, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2010, at A15.  Why did she work on those 
cases but not the ACA litigation? 
One way to test my hypothesis about Justice Kagan is to imagine what 
would happen if the Justices were to vote 5-4 to uphold the ACA, with 
Justice Kennedy siding with the moderate-liberal wing against the four 
conservatives.  Justice Kennedy, as the senior Justice in the majority, 
would decide who would write the opinion, but it would be extremely 
unlikely that he would ask Justice Kagan to do so.  Thinking about the 
reasons why, the case for Justice Kagan’s recusal becomes clearer. 
The Supreme Court is, of course, a political institution, and its de-
cisions usually reflect the Justices’ values.  Nothing in this Rebuttal 
suggests that the Justices should recuse themselves simply because they 
have strong political connections to the administration in power or 
preexisting substantive views about the issues before the Court.  We 
knew how Justices Scalia and Alito felt about abortion before they were 
on the Court—and the same for Justices Ginsburg and Breyer—but 
that does not mean they should have recused themselves from abor-
tion cases.  And many Supreme Court Justices have resolved issues im-
portant to the Presidents who appointed them.  But, we do not have a 
prior case in which a Justice had to resolve a constitutional issue so 
important to a President running for reelection who appointed that 
Justice, and where the Justice herself headed a federal agency involved 
in that very litigation.  I am more than willing to say that, if all those 
things happen again, that future Justice should not hear the case. 
Justice Thomas, however, is a different matter.  The calls for his 
recusal stem mostly from his wife’s past activities lobbying against the 
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ACA, and her making money by doing so, as well as a public statement 
Justice Thomas made approving of his wife’s political activities.  I be-
lieve that requiring recusal because of a spouse’s involvement with an 
issue, absent a current financial stake in the controversy, is a danger-
ous precedent.  For example, the wife of Judge Reinhardt, who recently 
wrote the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the Proposition 8 litigation, 
worked for the ACLU in a leadership capacity for many years and pub-
licly spoke out in favor of same-sex marriage (and maybe even had 
some contact with the plaintiffs’ attorneys in the case).  See Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2011) (denying recusal 
motion); see also Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 
372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012) (merits opinion).  I do not think, how-
ever, and neither apparently do any liberals, that Judge Reinhardt 
needed to recuse himself for those reasons.  In his order denying the 
recusal motion, Judge Reinhardt said that  
my wife and I share many fundamental interests by virtue of our marriage, 
but her views regarding issues of public significance are her own, and can-
not be imputed to me, no matter how prominently she expresses 
them. . . . Because my wife is an independent woman, I cannot accept Pro-
ponents’ position that my impartiality might reasonably be questioned 
. . . because of her opinions or the views of the organization she heads.  
Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d at 912. 
There could come a point where a Justice’s spouse is so closely 
identified with current litigation that their relationship would require 
recusal, but absent a direct financial stake, it is fair to assume that 
judges and Justices will decide cases without regard to spousal pres-
sure.  A different rule would be difficult to implement and would 
greatly limit what careers spouses of judges could pursue. 
The recusal issues pertaining to Justices Thomas and Kagan do 
have one thing in common, and here again Professor Ifill and I are in 
complete agreement.  Given the importance of the litigation—
politically, legally, and for the future of health care in this country—
and the proximity of the case to a presidential election, both Justices 
should provide a public statement explaining their reasons for not 
recusing themselves.  As Professor Ifill said so well, “Transparency will 
strengthen the public’s confidence in the Court and will better position 
litigants to protect their constitutional right to have their cases heard by 
a Court that satisfies both the fact and appearance of impartiality.”   
Court commentators have resoundingly criticized Justice Roberts’s 
implicit defense in his year-end report of the Justices’ silence on these 
issues.  See, e.g., Andrew Kreig, Chief Justice’s Report Ducks Ethics Scandals, 
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JUST INTEGRITY PROJECT, http://justiceintegrity.org/index.php? 
otion=com_content&view=article&id=533&catid=44&sectionid=1&Ite
mid=1 (last visited Feb. 15, 2012); Mike Sacks, Chief Justice Roberts’ De-
fense Of Supreme Court Ethics Doesn’t Soothe Critics, HUFFPOST POLITICS 
(Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/05/chief-
justice-john-roberts-supreme-court-ethics_n_1184780.html.  There are 
nonfrivolous reasons for suggesting recusal, and the Justices would 
further the rule of law by explaining their decisions to stay on the case.  
Their failure to do so further removes the Court from the American 
people and will make it much easier for the losing side to argue that 
the eventual decision resulted more from political and partisan con-
cerns than from good-faith legal analysis. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
 
To Recuse or Not to Recuse?  The Need for Standards 
 
SHERRILYN A. IFILL 
 
Professor Segall raises compelling and important questions about 
Justice Kagan’s impartiality based on her involvement or—if I am read-
ing his Rebuttal correctly—her perhaps deliberate noninvolvement in 
discussions surrounding the constitutionality of the developing health 
care legislation during the time she served as Solicitor General.  I sup-
pose that the Solicitor General’s deliberate decision not to involve 
herself with Administration-backed legislation based on the expecta-
tion that she would be nominated to the Supreme Court in the near 
future could raise questions about her impartiality, but it seems like a 
stretch—more the stuff of conspiracy theory than reasonable question.  
But as Justice Rehnquist pointed out in Laird v. Tatum, the Justice fac-
ing a recusal motion is in the best position to know all of the facts.  
Order Denying Recusal Motion, 409 U.S. 824, 824 n.1 (1972) (memo-
randum of Rehnquist, J.).  Professor Segall rightly argues that an opin-
ion from Justice Kagan could shed light on the motivation  
for her arms-length stance from the health care legislation during  
her time as Solicitor General. 
With regard to Justice Thomas’s support of the work of his wife 
Ginni Thomas, the comparison to Ninth Circuit Judge Reinhardt in 
the Proposition 8 case does not change my view.  Mrs. Reinhardt’s 
work in the leadership of the ACLU and her public support of same-
sex marriage hardly compares to the political activity and inflammatory 
public statements that have been Ginni Thomas’s near-exclusive focus 
for the past two years.  For example, I would not argue that Mrs. 
Thomas’s work for the Heritage Foundation raises questions about 
Justice Thomas’s impartiality in cases involving affirmative action, gun 
rights, or other issues on which that organization has staked out clear 
positions.  However, Mrs. Thomas’s formation of Liberty Central was 
motivated, developed, and focused almost exclusively on what she and 
her supporters regard as the “tyrannical” passage of the health care 
legislation.  Mrs. Thomas reportedly suggested that the law was “un-
constitutional.”  Kathleen Hennessey & David G. Savage, Justice’s Wife 
Seeks Repeal of Healthcare Law, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, at A9.  And in 
one interview, she called it a “corrupt . . . power grab.”  Power Player of 
the Week:  Ginni Thomas (Fox News television broadcast May 23, 2010), 
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available at http://www.libertycentral.org/news/ginni-thomas-talks-about-
liberty-central-2/.  Justice Thomas’s statements last year in support of 
his wife’s work “in defense of liberty” thus appear to be specifically di-
rected at her activism in opposition to the health care bill.  Jeffrey 
Toobin, Partners, NEW YORKER, Aug. 29, 2011, at 40, 48. 
Moreover, it is the Court itself that makes the argument that Su-
preme Court Justices are like no other federal judge.  Chief Justice 
Roberts claims that since Justices cannot be replaced, they should not 
recuse themselves from cases unless absolutely necessary.  See JOHN G. 
ROBERTS, JR., 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 9 
(2011), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-
end/2011year-endreport.pdf.  But isn’t this characteristic also the rea-
son that Supreme Court Justices should hold themselves to a higher 
standard of conduct?  Mrs. Thomas is not in the same position as Mrs. 
Reinhardt or former Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell, who was mar-
ried to Third Circuit Court of Appeals judge Marjorie O. Rendell for 
forty years.  Her husband is a Justice of the one court explicitly created 
by the Constitution and in which the federal government’s judicial 
power is vested.  I am not arguing that Mrs. Thomas should give up 
her free speech rights, but the consequence of her intemperate state-
ments and targeted activism against the health care law may be that 
her husband cannot decide the law’s constitutionality.  
In any case, I would be greatly satisfied if Justice Thomas, like Judge 
Reinhardt, would write an opinion explaining his decision not to recu-
se himself from hearing the case.  It is not hard to imagine what Justice 
Thomas would conclude, but his reasoning in presumably rejecting 
recusal would help future litigants and the public understand how the 
Justices view the issue of impartiality and the grounds for recusal. 
Of course Professor Segall and I are at a significant disadvantage, 
and our speculation only supports the point on which we both agree.  
The Justices themselves are in the best position to know the facts 
that underlie credible claims.  Thus, when questions arise, especial-
ly in cases of great constitutional import, the Justices should re-
spond with public opinions or statements explaining why they will 
or will not recuse themselves.  
In recently reviewing then–Justice Rehnquist’s statement support-
ing his refusal to withdraw from hearing Laird v. Tatum, I was struck 
that he chose to issue a statement on recusal although “neither the 
Court nor any Justice individually appears ever to have done so.”  Or-
der Denying Recusal Motion, 409 U.S. at 824.  Thirty-two years later, 
Justice Scalia emphasized a similar point when he criticized the Sierra 
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Club for its inability to cite to relevant precedent to support its recusal 
motion.  He remarked: 
When I learned that Sierra Club had filed a recusal motion in this case, I 
assumed that the motion would be replete with citations of legal authority, 
and would provide some instances of cases in which, because of activity 
similar to what occurred here, Justices have recused themselves or at least 
have been asked to do so.  
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., Order Denying Recusal Motion, 
541 U.S. 913, 922 (2004) (memorandum of Scalia, J.).  Talk about a 
rock and hard place.  Forty years after Laird and eight years after the 
famous duck-hunting case involving the Sierra Club and Dick Cheney, 
litigants seeking recusal of Supreme Court Justices remain in the same 
position—unable to cite to Supreme Court precedent largely because 
the Court refuses to issue written opinions explaining recusal decisions.  
The solution is for Chief Justice Roberts and the other Justices to 
issue a set of procedures governing their recusal practices.  These pro-
cedures should be uniform and transparent.  At a minimum, they 
ought to require the Justices to issue recusal decisions in cases where 
recusal motions have been filed.  In some instances, these decisions 
may be one- or two-line summary explanations.  But in other cases, the 
Justices—giving due regard to the weight of the concerns raised, the 
high-profile nature of the case, factual inaccuracies circulating in the 
public, and the potentially divisive nature of the case—should offer 
detailed and clear explanations of their recusal decisions. 
As I’ve said elsewhere, it is unfortunate that we seem to discuss the 
issue of Supreme Court recusal practice only in the context of high-
profile controversial cases.  See The Diane Rehm Show:  Conflict of Interest 
on the Supreme Court (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 25, 2011), transcript 
available at http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2011-08-25/conflict-
interest-supreme-court/transcript.  The issue is really not about who 
should recuse themselves from hearing the challenge to the health 
care law.  At issue is a matter that threatens to erode the public’s belief 
in the impartiality of our highest court.  We have been grappling with 
this concern at least since Justice Rehnquist’s now widely condemned 
decision not to recuse himself from hearing Laird v. Tatum in 1972, 
and the Court has still refused to develop a consistent, uniform, and 
transparent recusal practice. 
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Time for a Change:  The Sorry Practice of Supreme Court Recusals 
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Professor Ifill and I are in complete agreement that Supreme Court 
Justices need to “issue a set of procedures governing their recusal 
practices.  These procedures should be uniform and transparent.  At a 
minimum, they ought to require the Justices to issue recusal decisions 
in cases where recusal motions have been filed.  In some instances, 
these decisions may be one- or two-line summary explanations.  But in 
other cases, the Justices . . . should offer detailed and clear explana-
tions of their recusal decisions.”  
Professor Ifill and I, however, remain in disagreement as to whether 
Justices Thomas and Kagan should recuse themselves from the Afford-
able Care Act (ACA) litigation.  As to Justice Thomas, Professor Ifill 
points to Mrs. Thomas’s activities with Liberty Central that were “moti-
vated, developed, and focused almost exclusively on what she and her 
supporters regard as the ‘tyrannical’ passage of the health care legisla-
tion.”  Professor Ifill further points to general statements made by 
Justice Thomas in support of his wife’s work defending liberty. 
As I explained in my Rebuttal, and as Judge Reinhardt made clear 
in his opinion denying recusal in the Proposition 8 litigation, it is dan-
gerous business to ask judges and Justices to recuse themselves from 
cases because of their spouse’s political activities.  Why stop at spouses?  
How about a child, a best friend, or a mother-in-law?  Furthermore, 
imputing to a judge the views of his or her spouse expresses an old-
fashioned view of marriage and may deter spouses, most often women, 
from pursuing important careers.  If Judge Reinhardt’s wife is allowed 
to work for the ACLU of Southern California and frequently espouse 
the view that same-sex marriage is both desirable and constitutional, 
without Judge Reinhardt recusing himself from the Proposition 8 liti-
gation, then Ginni Thomas can certainly engage in political activities 
opposed to the ACA without Justice Thomas having to recuse himself 
from that case.  Justice Thomas’s general and vague support of his 
wife’s career does not change that calculus in any meaningful manner. 
Justice Kagan, however, is in a significantly different situation.  Pro-
fessor Ifill summarizes my argument as centered on Kagan’s “perhaps 
deliberate noninvolvement in discussions surrounding the constitu-
tionality of the developing health care legislation during the time she 
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served as Solicitor General.”  Professor Ifill then argues that the “Solic-
itor General’s deliberate decision not to involve herself with Admin-
istration-backed legislation based on the expectation that she would be 
nominated to the Supreme Court in the near future could raise ques-
tions about her impartiality, but it seems like a stretch—more the stuff 
of conspiracy theory than reasonable question.” 
Professor Ifill has misconstrued and understated my arguments for 
Justice Kagan’s recusal.  The relevant standards are whether Kagan 
served as an “adviser” or “counsel” on the ACA litigation during her 
governmental service or whether her “impartiality” could reasonably 
be questioned.  28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006).  On the day the bill was 
passed, she permitted her Office to work on the case in the lower 
courts against the Solicitor General’s normal policy of handling only 
Supreme Court litigation.  On that same day, she celebrated the pas-
sage of the ACA over email with Laurence Tribe.  See Eric Segall, A Lib-
eral’s Lament on Kagan and Health Care, SLATE (Dec. 8, 2011, 4:07 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/1
2/obamacare_and_the_supreme_court_should_elena_kagan_recuse_her
self_.html.  Also on that day, apparently, she decided to remove herself 
from the case during her remaining tenure as Solicitor General.  Id.  I 
use the word “apparently” because the government has refused to turn 
over documents pertaining to Kagan’s work on the case based on the 
attorney work-product doctrine.  Declaration of Valier H. Hall In Sup-
port of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 14-15, Media 
Research Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 10-2013 (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 
2011).  To argue on one hand that Kagan was not an adviser or coun-
selor on the case but to argue on the other hand that information re-
garding her participation in the case is protected by privileges normally 
reserved for attorneys and their clients is highly suspect. 
I am not suggesting that Justice Kagan has not told the truth about 
her participation or lack thereof in the ACA litigation.  I am arguing 
that her Office’s direct involvement in the case, coupled with the as-
sertion of the work product privilege in response to requests about her 
participation, suggest that she should not sit on the case.  A similar 
rule has sometimes been applied to United States attorneys who be-
came federal judges.  These judges have not been allowed to preside 
over cases on which their former offices worked, even if they had no 
direct involvement, because the knowledge and acts of their assistants 
are imputed to them.  United States v. Arnpriester, 37 F.3d 466, 467 
(9th Cir. 1994). 
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A few weeks ago, Justice Kagan recused herself from a high-profile 
affirmative action case involving the admissions policy of the University 
of Texas.  See Order Granting Petition for Certiorari, Fisher v. Univ. of 
Tex., No. 11-345 (Feb. 21, 2012).  She has also recused herself from 
the important Arizona immigration case that the Supreme Court will 
hear later this Term.  See Order Granting Petition for Certiorari, Arizona 
v. United States, No. 11-182 (Dec. 12, 2011). 
In fact, Justice Kagan has recused herself from many cases over the 
past two years.  It appears that she decided not to work on only one 
case while she was the Solicitor General—the ACA litigation.   
What possible reason could she have for working on such high-profile 
issues as immigration and affirmative action, as well as many other 
cases, but not the ACA litigation?  There is no plausible answer to 
 that question that obviates the need for Justice Kagan to recuse  
herself from the case. 
Professor Ifill and I have both bemoaned the Supreme Court’s ap-
palling lack of standards and transparency when it comes to the Justices’ 
recusal decisions.  Sadly, from the beginning of this country’s history, 
Supreme Court Justices have decided cases that normal judges would 
never hear.  Chief Justice Marshall decided Marbury v. Madison, despite 
the fact that he and his brother were partly to blame for the plaintiff’s 
injury in the case.  Louis J. Virelli III, The (Un)constitutionality of Supreme 
Court Recusal Standards, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1181, 1202-03.  Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes presided over cases that he had previously heard as a 
judge in Massachusetts, Justice Black ruled on the constitutionality of a 
federal law that he helped draft, and Justice Rehnquist declined to 
recuse himself from a case involving a federal law he worked on dur-
ing his time in the Nixon Administration.  Id. at 1203-04.  These are all 
unfortunate examples of Supreme Court Justices acting improperly 
and without integrity.  Justice Kagan can either choose to continue this 
sorry history, or to do the right thing and recuse herself from the ACA 
litigation.  Needless to say, I am not holding my breath for the latter. 
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